ObjectiveThe COVID-19 pandemic and government measures implemented to counter the spread of the infection may be a major stressor affecting the psychological health of university students. This study aimed to explore how anxiety symptoms changed during the pandemic.Methods676 students at Zurich University of Applied Sciences participated in the first and second survey waves. Anxiety symptoms were assessed using the Generalized Anxiety Disorder-Scale-7. Risk and protective factors were examined.ResultsGAD-7 scores decreased significantly from T0 to T1. Participants with moderate-to-severe anxiety score were (...) 20.2 and 15.6% at T0 and T1, respectively. The following positively predicted anxiety: older age, female gender, non-Swiss nationality, loneliness, participants’ concern about their own health, and interaction between time and participants’ concern about their own health. Resilience and social support negatively predicted anxiety.ConclusionsOur findings provide information for public health measures and psychological interventions supporting the mental health of university students during the COVID-19 emergency. (shrink)

A growing consensus in the literature on agentive modals has it that ability modals like ‘can’ or ‘able to’ have a _dual_, i.e. interpretations of ‘must’ or ‘cannot but’ which stand to _necessity_ as ability stands to _possibility_. We argue that this thesis (which we call ‘Agentive Duality’) is much more controversial than meets the eye. While Agentive Duality follows from the orthodox possibility analysis of ability given natural assumptions, it sits uneasily with a wide range of alternative proposals which (...) are unified by the idea that ability requires _control_. In particular, we show that against the background of a control requirement on ability, Agentive Duality can be used to derive absurd predictions featuring this dual. Far from being a purely definitional thesis, Agentive Duality thus affords a new lens through which to assess the long-standing debate between possibility analyses of ability and their discontents. (shrink)

Barbara Vetter proposes that certain epistemic and metasemantic challenges to our theorizing about metaphysical modality can be met by an approach which generalizes from every day paradigms of objective modality – notably the abilities and dispositions familiar to us “from the context of action” – to give content to the more abstract notion of a most general objective modality: metaphysical modality. I argue that the ability ascriptions which are central to our day to day practical reasoning are permeated with opacity (...) and therefore make for problematic paradigms of an objective modality. While Vetter could retrospectively “purify” her sample of paradigms, this would leave her in a similar position as those who seek to restrict a particularly broad modality, e.g. a priori conceivability, to its objective core. I conclude by taking on Vetter’s pessimistic conjecture that proponents of different approaches to the metasemantic challenge operate under assumptions so dramatically different that we should not expect them to even share a subject matter. Against this, I give an argument which suggests that so long as there is agreement regarding the theoretical role of metaphysical modality, it would be surprising if it made a difference whether one approached metaphysical modality by generalizing from one well-understood modality rather than by restricting another. Keywords: objective modality, abilities, opacity, broadest necessity. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an analytical and normative framework to re-visit the question of whether state parties should derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in order to combat the COVID-19 pandemic via harsh ‘lockdown’ measures. It is three-pronged. First, I show that the predominant debate on the (non-)derogation question is informed by a textual approach to adjudication, which severely limits the analytical and evaluative horizon for addressing the issue. Most importantly, it cannot address one salient fact (...) about the effects of lockdown measures, namely their highly disproportionate effects on vulnerable groups and minorities. Second, I argue that proportionality assessment should be the basis for determining whether state parties ought to derogate or not. This is because proportionality’s very purpose is in part to track the effects of state interferences on minorities and vulnerable groups by measuring the disproportionate burden imposed on them. It is also because proportionality assessment has very different requirements between limitation clauses built into the relevant Convention articles (e.g. Article 5, Articles 8–11) and the derogation clause (Article 15) under the ECHR. Surprisingly, while the emerging literature almost always mentions proportionality as an important component of the analysis, it does not investigate the extent to which each regime (derogation or limitation) better performs it, and why. Third, I draw from the philosophical literature on the ‘right to justification’ to clarify the egalitarian and justificatory function of proportionality. Unlike derogation, limitation clauses have a much higher and systematic requirement of justification, which makes the case for non-derogation clearer and stronger. (shrink)

A prominent view of psychopathic moral reasoning suggests that psychopathic individuals cannot properly distinguish between moral wrongs and other types of wrongs. The present study evaluated this view by examining the extent to which 109 incarcerated offenders with varying degrees of psychopathy could distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions relative to each other and to nonincarcerated healthy controls. Using a modified version of the classic Moral/Conventional Transgressions task that uses a forced-choice format to minimize strategic responding, the present study found (...) that total psychopathy score did not predict performance on the task. Task performance was explained by some individual subfacets of psychopathy and by other variables unrelated to psychopathy, such as IQ. The authors conclude that, contrary to earlier claims, insufficient data exist to infer that psychopathic individuals cannot know what is morally wrong. (shrink)

Ethics teaching in engineering can be problematic because of student perceptions of its subjective, ambiguous and philosophical content. The use of discipline-specific case studies has helped to address such perceptions, as has practical decision making and problem solving approaches based on some ethical frameworks. However, a need exists for a wider range of creative methods in ethics education to help complement the variety of activities and learning experiences within the engineering curriculum. In this work, a novel approach is presented in (...) which first-year undergraduate students are responsible for proposing ethics education activities of relevance to their peers and discipline area. The students are prepared for the task through a short introduction on engineering ethics, whereby generic frameworks for moral and professional conduct are discussed, and discipline and student-relevance contexts provided. The approach has been used in four departments of engineering at Imperial College London, and has led to the generation of many creative ideas for wider student engagement in ethics awareness, reflection and understanding. The paper presents information on the premise of the introductory sessions for supporting the design task, and an evaluation of the student experience of the course and task work. Examples of proposals are given to demonstrate the value of such an approach to teachers, and ultimately to the learning experiences of the students themselves. (shrink)

The recent development and growth oforganic livestock farming and the relateddevelopment of national and internationalregulations has fueled discussions amongscientists and philosophers concerning theproper conceptualization of animal welfare.These discussions on livestock welfare inorganic farming draw on the conventionaldiscussions and disputes on animal welfare thatinvolve issues such as different definitions ofwelfare (clinical health, absence of suffering,sum of positive and negative experiences,etc.), the possibility for objective measuresof animal welfare, and the acceptable level ofwelfare. It seems clear that livestock welfareis a value-laden concept and (...) that animalwelfare science cannot be made independent ofquestions of values and ethics. The questioninvestigated here is whether those values thatunderpin organic farming, in particular, alsoaffect the interpretation of livestock welfare,and, if so, how. While some of the issuesraised in connection with organic farming arerelatively uncontroversial, others are not. Theintroduction of organic farming values seems tointroduce new criteria for what counts as goodanimal welfare, as well as a different ethicalbasis for making moral decisions on welfare.Organic farming embodies distinctive systemicor communitarian ethical ideas and the organicvalues are connected to a systemic conceptionof nature, of agriculture, of the farm, and ofthe animal. The new criteria of welfare arerelated to concepts such as naturalness,harmony, integrity, and care. While the organicvalues overlap with those involved in theconventional discussion of animal welfare, someof them suggest a need to set new prioritiesand to re-conceptualize animal welfare – forexample, with respect to ``naturalness,'''' inrelation to the possibilities for expression ofnatural behavior and in relation to animalintegrity as a concept for organismic harmony.The organic perspective also seems to suggest awider range of solutions to welfare problemsthan changes in farm routines or operations onthe animals. The systemic solutions include thechoice and reproduction of suitable breeds,changes in the farm structure, and changes inthe larger production and consumption system – including consumer perceptions andpreferences. But the organic values may alsocall for sacrifices of individual welfare in aconventional sense in order to advance welfarefrom the perspective of organic farming.Whether this is good or bad cannot be decidedwithout entering into an inquiry and discussionof the values and ethics involved. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; Indicative and counterfactual conditionals, Analysis, Volume 39, Issue 3, 1 June 1979, Pages 139–141, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/39.3.139.

Universal access to health care is still a dream rather than a reality in the United States. This is partly because a rule of rescue, by impelling us to help people in need, urges us to ignore the limits of our health care policies wherever those limits would adversely affect a given individual. As the rule of rescue undermines whatever limits we set on health care entitlements, it can thwart the cost containment so essential to expanding access. Rather than accept (...) unlimited expense, we have thus far declined to universalize health care. The situation is exacerbated by an economic insulation shielding patients and physicians from the costs of care, prompting both to regard health care as free, an unlimited right. To reverse this costly entitlement mentality and place reasonable limits on rescue, patients must exercise greater personal responsibility for the costs of their care by directly experiencing some of the economic consequences of their health care decisions. Several mechanisms are available to accomplish this goal without posing economic barriers to needed care or penalizing people for becoming ill. Keywords: Clinton health plan, rationing, rule of rescue CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Rescher has presented a proof that a completed science is logically impossible; not every truth can be known. I show that the proof is valid only if it is read de re. One of its premises, however, is an obvious truth only on a de dicto reading; read de re it is false. What the proof shows, therefore, is that science has no limits and any true proposition can be known. We can, however, know it only in the meagre de (...) re, and not in the informationally rich de dicto, sense of 'know'. (shrink)

While agreeing with Poteat that the modern Western culture has gone awry in a humanly destructive way, the paper contends tha the culprit was not, as Poteat claims, Enlightenment critical philosophy, but the materialistic values of the bourgeois form of life and the puritanical view of knowledge and the naturalistic worldview that they generated. Accordingly, the solution proposed is not Poteat's unreflected experience and commonsense worldview but a shift to a humanistic culture-generating stance and a critical humanistic philosophy.

The purpose of the article is to challenge widely accepted views of the relationship among rationality, morality, and prudence. It contends that we cannot understand either the rational or the moral enterprise without a correct philosophical view of the human self, and that such a view of the self is impossible without taking account of the rational and the moral enterprises themselves. The paper concludes that the moral point of view is anchored in the nature of selfhood so that one (...) can be neither rational and immoral nor prudent and immoral. (shrink)

The meaning of the word philosophy, “love of wisdom,” the dominant interest of Socrates, the developments of Greek philosophy in Epicureanism and Stoicism, Kant's reliance on the practical reason as a clue to reality—all justify the direction of attention in this essay from the abstract theoretical to the concrete practical aspects of thought. Not that the two can or ought to be separated from, or opposed to one another; for human personality is a unity, and theory and practice must act (...) and react the one on the other. The familiar saying: “More harm is wrought for want of thought than even want of heart,” indicates that in moral activity under-standing of consequences is no less necessary than goodness of intention or motive. The preacher who declared that he was an Agnostic in mind, and a Christian in heart, if he really knew himself and was not deceiving himself with a rhetorical phrase, was in a perilous and unsatisfactory state of mental equilibrium. (shrink)

Is it possible to say anything on the well-worn theme of human freedom or unfreedom which has not been ahready better said by someone else before us? It may be doubted; yet it is always worth while to see whether we cannot at least set what is perhaps already familiar to us in a fresh light and so come to a clearer comprehension of our own meaning. This, at any rate, is all that will be attempted in these pages; I (...) have spoken in an earlier essay of the “practical situation” in which we find ourselves whenever we have to make a decision as involving indetermination , and my purpose is simply to make it plainer to myself, and so incidentally perhaps to a reader, what I mean by such an expression. I shall start, then, by adopting what we may perhaps agree to call a phenomenological attitude to the subject; that is, I will try to describe the facts in a way which anyone who recalls occasions when he has been driven to take a decision will recognize as faithful to his experience, without imparting into the description any element of explanatory speculative hypothesis. The description is meant to be one which will be admitted to be true to the “appearances,” independently of any theory about the “freedom of the will”—to describe correctly that which it is the object of all such theories to explain. (shrink)

We show that every infinite computable partial ordering has either an infinite Δ 0 2 chain or an infinite Π 0 2 antichain. Our main result is that this cannot be improved: We construct an infinite computable partial ordering that has neither an infinite Δ 0 2 chain nor an infinite Δ 0 2 antichain.

E. H. Gombrich’s bestselling history of the world for young readers tells the story of mankind from the Stone Age to the atomic bomb, focusing not on small detail but on the sweep of human experience, the extent of human achievement, and the depth of its frailty. The product of a generous and humane sensibility, this timeless account makes intelligible the full span of human history. In forty concise chapters, Gombrich tells the story of man from the stone age to (...) the atomic bomb. In between emerges a colorful picture of wars and conquests, grand works of art, and the spread and limitations of science. This is a text dominated not by dates and facts, but by the sweep of mankind’s experience across the centuries, a guide to humanity’s achievements and an acute witness to its frailties. (shrink)

ACESSO À JUSTIÇA: DELINEAMENTOS GERAIS E ANÁLISE NO PROJETO DE NOVO CÓDIGO PROCESSUAL CIVIL.